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Introduction 
In keeping with the theme of this special issue of 
IRIE, “business intelligence meets moral intelli-
gence”, the paper will seek to demonstrate that with 
regard to the dissemination of information by the 
media, its “business intelligence” must be congruent 
with “moral intelligence” and when in conflict moral 
intelligence on the basis of universal moral principles 
that the media itself is committed to, must always 
take precedent over the media‟s own business 
intelligence. The communication of information to 
the public by the media, offline and online, even if 
conceived merely as another market commodity, 
commits the media to ethical conduct irrespective of 
any other commercial interests that may come into 
conflict with the media‟s ethical commitments to the 
public. In summary, this is for at least three rea-
sons:  
(1) Information as communication has a dual 
inherent normative structure that of necessity 
commits its communication by all informational 
agents, including the media especially, to ethi-
cal conduct that cannot be avoided or overrid-
den by any other conflicting self-interest, in-
cluding commercial interests.  
(2) With regard to the dissemination of information 
in the form of news, the media, and especially 
the media in the form of journalism, is commit-
ted moreover, by its own internal professional 
ethical code, to the fundamental principle that 
the public has a right to know and be informed 
on matters of public interest truthfully, in an 
unbiased, balanced and fair manner108. 
                                               
108 The public‟s right to know or the public‟s right to 
be informed on matters of public interest is a fun-
damental principle of journalism enshrined in 
practically all journalistic ethical codes around the 
world. It is in fact, what gives the media in the 
form of journalism, its special status as the 4th 
Estate, a role that allows them “freedom of the 
press” and other special privileges not shared or 
allowed to other commercial enterprises, even to 
the government that has limited powers to what 
information it can lawfully access and disseminate 
on matters concerning its citizens. This places the 
media, at least in the form of journalism, in a spe-
cial privileged position in the access and dissemi-
nation of information to the public. It is a privilege 
(3) Even if information in the form of communica-
tion is construed as a marketable commodity 
subject to the same commercial exploitation as 
other marketable commodities, the media per-
ceived merely as a commercial enterprise is 
also bound to ethical conduct. For consider: if 
information is conceived merely as a market-
able commodity, then media-markets have a 
similar responsibility as the food industry or the 
pharmaceutical industry, for example; namely, 
that the production and delivery of those prod-
ucts, generally perceived as public goods (food, 
medicines, information), are what they claim to 
be (their description is true or truthful – for ex-
ample, meat is real meat and not some “meat-
substitute” designed to look like real meat in 
order to mislead or deceive the consumers). 
Hence, those public goods are fit for human 
consumption and meet normative standards 
both in their production and distribution. Those 
standards, in turn, are regulated both within 
and outside those industries for the ultimate 
protection and good of society. We can, there-
fore, ask no less of the media, even if we per-
ceive it purely as a commercial enterprise. 
In relation to the potential conflict of roles within 
the media as both public informers and commercial 
enterprises, the paper will also briefly analyse the 
specific roles of the different types of the media -  in 
particular, journalism and public relations - in order 
to show how those roles are epistemologically and 
ethically inconsistent with each other and moreover 
how the convergence of those inconsistent media 
roles is conducive to media corruption – that is, the 
corruption of information communicated to the 
public. Given financial cut-backs within media or-
ganisations, the corporate media increasingly relies 
on media releases produced by Public Relations 
practitioners to communicate information to the 
public.  In view of this practice, can the Fourth 
Estate be trusted to tell people the truth all the time 
or even some of the time? Should the public adopt a 
more sceptical attitude towards the media in view of 
their commercial interests which are not always 
congruent with their role as information providers? 
                                                                            
which can be of great benefit to society as the 
exposure of the Watergate scandal by the Wash-
ington Post‟s investigative journalists demon-
strates, and of great harm when that privilege is 
abused as in typical cases of media corruption 
that will be outlined below.  
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The Dual-Obligation Information 
Theory (DOIT) 
The dual-obligation information theory (DOIT) 
model comprises two main parts that together seek 
to demonstrate that information is doubly normative 
(Spence 2007a): 
(A) Information has an inherent normative struc-
ture that commits its producers, communicators 
and users, everyone in fact that deals with in-
formation, to certain mandatory epistemological 
and ethical commitments; 
(B) The negligent or purposeful abuse of informa-
tion in violation of the epistemological and ethi-
cal commitments to which its normative inher-
ent structure gives rise is also a violation of 
universal rights – specifically, universal rights to 
freedom and wellbeing to which all agents are 
entitled by virtue of being agents, and in par-
ticular informational agents.  
Hence, the abuse of information through, for exam-
ple, misinformation practices, constitutes (a) a 
violation of the epistemological and ethical commit-
ments to which the inherent  normative structure of 
information gives rise and (b) a violation of universal 
rights to which all agents and specifically informa-
tional agents are entitled.  
Echoing Umberto Eco‟s claim in The Open Work 
(1989, 66) that with regard to human beings infor-
mation theory becomes communication theory - the 
paper will show that the demonstrated dual norma-
tive structure of information in terms of its own 
inherent normative structure, as well as the univer-
sal rights of informational agents to which it gives 
rise, confirms and supports Eco‟s claim. 
The Normative Structure of Information 
In providing the dual normative model for the 
evaluation of information outlined above, the paper 
will employ an epistemological account of informa-
tion based on a minimal nuclear definition of infor-
mation. Following Luciano Floridi it will define infor-
mation as “well formed meaningful data that is 
truthful” (2005) and following Fred Dreske it will 
define information as “an objective commodity 
capable of yielding knowledge”; knowledge in turn, 
defined as “information caused belief” (1999, 44-45 
and 86). 
What is necessary for both information and knowl-
edge is truth. For information without truth is not 
strictly speaking information but either misinforma-
tion (the unintentional dissemination of well-formed 
and meaningful false data) or disinformation (the 
intentional dissemination of false “information”). Of 
course, journalists, for example, both offline and 
online cannot always know with certainty whether 
the information they disseminate is true or not. 
However, in such cases, they should at least have a 
reasonable justified belief, responsive to at least 
some minimal objective verification capable of 
sustaining that belief that the information they 
disseminate is probably if not certainly true. One 
could make the case, for example, that the dissemi-
nation of “information” by journalists concerning the 
claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruc-
tion before the start of the war in Iraq was not 
based on a reasonable justified belief capable of 
yielding knowledge.  Insofar as this was the case, 
the dissemination of such “information” was misin-
formation at best, disinformation at worst. 
How about, however, media reports that merely 
stated the US government‟s claims that Iraq had 
weapons of mass destruction? What is the informa-
tional status of such media reports, given that 
information must be true or at least truthful? Insofar 
as those reports were true (the US government did 
in fact make those claims as reported by the media) 
then those media reports qualify as information 
because true, notwithstanding that the claims 
themselves were untrue or not known to be true. 
For the truth that renders those reports informa-
tional concerns and relates to what the US govern-
ment claimed and not the truth about the claims 
themselves. Generally, media reports of the form (Z) 
= “X claimed Y” would qualify as information so long 
as it is true that “X claimed Y” even when “Y” is 
untrue. For the truth-maker that renders the state-
ment “X claimed Y” as information refers to only 
what “X claimed about Y” and not to whether “Y” 
itself is true or false. For the report “Z” only commits 
itself to the truth of “X claimed Y” and not to the 
truth of “Y”. To see this more clearly, take the 
statement “X claimed Y although Y is untrue”. This 
statement is perfectly consistent with both it being 
true that “X claimed Y” (information) but “Y”, con-
trary to the facts, being false (misinformation).  This 
is because the report “Z” that qualifies as true 
information concerns only “what X said” and not 
about whether “what X said is true or false”. Of 
course the media, and specifically investigative 
journalists, have an additional ethical responsibility 
to enquire into and inform the public, as a matter of 
public interest, whether in fact what “X claimed 
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about Y” was true or false. That is, investigative 
journalist should not only be concerned about what 
“X said about Y” but also be concerned about 
“whether Y is true” and report on the truth or falsity 
of “Y” accordingly. 
Finally, on another related topic, media “news”, 
insofar as it is true or truthful, can also be construed 
and defined as a type of new information. So, for 
example, the statement “Israel invades Gaza” would 
have qualified as “news” in the form of “new infor-
mation” when it was reported in newspapers around 
the world several weeks ago. However, although 
now it still qualifies as information - because as a 
matter of reported fact Israel did invade Gaza some 
weeks ago - it no longer qualifies as “news” as it is 
now at present archival “old information” and not 
“new information”109.  
Using the minimal account of information described 
above, the paper will now develop a normative 
account of information, which demonstrates and 
describes the generic epistemological and ethical 
commitments that necessarily arise in the dissemi-
nation of information.  
Briefly, the argument is as follows: Insofar as infor-
mation is a type of knowledge (it must be capable of 
yielding knowledge, one must be able to learn from 
it) it must comply with the epistemological condi-
tions of knowledge, specifically, that of truth. And 
insofar as the dissemination of information is based 
on the justified and rightful expectation among its 
disseminators and especially its users that such 
information should meet the minimal condition of 
truth, then the disseminators of information are 
committed to certain widely recognized and ac-
cepted epistemological criteria. Those epistemic 
criteria will in the main comprise objectivity as well 
as the independence, reliability, accuracy and trust-
worthiness of the sources that generate the infor-
mation. The epistemology of information, in turn, 
commits its disseminators to certain ethical princi-
ples and values, such as honesty, sincerity, truthful-
ness, trustworthiness and reliability (also epistemo-
logical values), and fairness, including justice, which 
requires the equal distribution of the informational 
goods to all citizens. Thus in terms of its dissemina-
tion, information, as a process and product of com-
                                               
109 I would like to acknowledge my thanks and 
gratitude to the reviewers of this paper for bring-
ing these additional matters and their relevance 
concerning the truth condition of information to 
my attention. 
munication110, has an intrinsic normative structure 
that commits everyone involved in its creation, 
production, search, communication and consump-
tion to epistemological and ethical norms and these 
norms being intrinsic to the normative structure of 
information are rationally unavoidable and thus not 
merely optional. 
The Rights of Informational Agents based on 




Gewirth‟s main thesis is that every rational agent112, 
in virtue of engaging in action, is logically committed 
to accept a supreme moral principle, the Principle of 
Generic Consistency (PGC). The basis of his thesis is 
found in his doctrine that action has an inherent 
normative structure, and because of this structure 
every rational agent, just in virtue of being an 
agent, is committed to certain necessary prudential 
and moral constraints. 
Gewirth undertakes to prove his claim that every 
agent, qua agent, is committed to certain prudential 
and moral constraints in virtue of the inherently 
normative structure of action in three main stages. 
First, he undertakes to show that by virtue of en-
gaging in voluntary and purposive action, every 
agent makes certain implicitly evaluative judgments 
about the goodness of his purposes, and hence 
about the necessary goodness of his freedom and 
                                               
110 This qualifying phrase is used to emphasize that 
it is only as a process and product of communica-
tion that information becomes inherently norma-
tive due to the reasonable and rightful expecta-
tions that informational agents have with regard 
to the truthful communication and dissemination 
of information. That is, we reasonably and 
rightfully expect and trust that we won‟t be lied to 
or misinformed when engaging in inter-
informational- communication practices with oth-
ers.  
111 A full and detailed analysis and defense of the 
argument for the PGC against all the major objec-
tions raised against it by various philosophers can 
be found in Spence 2006 (Chapters 1 to 3), De-
ryck Beyleveld (1991) and Alan Gewirth (1978). 
112 Understand “rational agent” to mean any puta-
tive agent who is minimally capable of inductive 
and deductive reasoning of the most basic and 
minimal kind including instrumental reasoning or 
“means-end reasoning”. 
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wellbeing, which are the necessary conditions for 
the fulfillment of his purposes. Secondly, he under-
takes to show that by virtue of the necessary good-
ness which an agent attaches to his freedom and 
wellbeing, the agent implicitly claims that he has 
rights to these. At this stage of the argument, these 
rights being merely self-regarding are only pruden-
tial rights. 
Thirdly, Gewirth undertakes to show that every 
agent must claim these rights in virtue of the suffi-
cient reason that he is a prospective purposive 
agent (PPA) who has purposes he wants to fulfill. 
Furthermore, every agent must accept that, since he 
has rights to his freedom and wellbeing for the 
sufficient reason that he is a PPA, he is logically 
committed, on pain of self-contradiction, to also 
accept the rational generalization that all PPAs have 
rights to freedom and wellbeing (Gewirth 1978, 48-
128). At this third stage of the argument these 
rights being not only self-regarding but also other-
regarding, are moral rights. The conclusion of 
Gewirth‟s argument for the PGC is in fact a genera-
lized statement for the PGC, namely, that all PPAs 
have universal rights to their freedom and wellbe-
ing.  
Applying the PGC to information, we can now make 
the further argument that information must not be 
disseminated in ways that violate informational 
agents‟ rights to freedom and wellbeing, individually 
or collectively, (Negative Rights). Moreover, infor-
mation must as far as possible be disseminated in 
ways that secure and promote the informational 
agents‟ rights to freedom and wellbeing (Positive 
Rights). Conceived as the Fourth Estate, this places 
a significant and important responsibility on the 
media, especially journalists, both offline and online, 
in their role as disseminators of information to the 
public. 
For example, certain media practices such as media 
release journalism (P. Simmons and E. Spence 2006, 
167-181), misleadingly and deceptively disseminate 
media release information produced by Public Rela-
tions professionals as objective and independent 
information though print or broadcast media sources 
(newspapers, television and radio) as “news”. This 
occurs without any disclosure that these so called 
“news stories” are sourced from media releases 
produced by PR professionals on behalf of their 
clients, often verbatim and sometimes with the 
journalists‟ bylines attached to them. Practices such 
as media release journalism are therefore ethically 
objectionable because they are designed to deceive 
and do deceive the public by stealth, sometimes in 
collusion with journalists and government repre-
sentatives. Moreover, these practices constitute 
media corruption for they are conducive to the 
corruption of the informational processes and prod-
ucts that are essential for informing citizens on 
matters of public interest in an objective, truthful 
and fair manner113. 
Constrained by space as well as being beyond the 
scope of this short paper I cannot discuss media 
corruption in any detail. Suffice to say, media cor-
ruption occurs primarily because matters of “busi-
ness intelligence” at both the individual level of 
media practitioners as well as at the institutional 
level of the professional practices of the media 
organizations themselves are allowed by omission or 
commission to override matters of “moral intelli-
gence”. As we saw above in section (2) matters of 
moral intelligence with regard to the communication 
of information by the media must of necessity, both 
with regard to principle and practice, always over-
ride matters of business intelligence when the two 
come into conflict. Even if we are to construe infor-
mation purely as a marketable commodity, the 
media and the market, in principle if not always in 
practice, can ethically co-exist as in the case of 
other commercial enterprises that distribute public 
goods to consumers, such as the food and pharma-
ceutical industries. Things go ethically wrong, how-
ever, when conflicting interests operating within the 
media become conducive to media corruption, such 
as the example of media release journalism outlined 
above. For a detailed analysis of a taxonomy of 
                                               
113 For a further analysis and discussion of corrup-
tion generally and media corruption, specifically, 
see the following: A. Quinn, and E. Spence. Two 
Dimensions of Photo Manipulation: Correction and 
Corruption. Melbourne: Australian Journal of Pro-
fessional and Applied Ethics, 2007; E. Spence.  
Corruption in the Media,  In Jeanette Kennett 
(Ed.), Proceedings of GovNet Annual Conference, 
Contemporary Issues in Governance, Melbourne, 
Monash University, Australia, ISBN 0-7326-2287-
5, 2005; S. Miller, P. Roberts, and E. Spence. Cor-
ruption and Anti-corruption: An Applied Philosoph-
ical Approach. Upper Saddle River, NJ, Pear-
son/Prentice Hall, 2005; E. Spence & B. Van 
Heekeren, Advertising Ethics. Upper Saddle River, 
NJ, Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005; and E. Spence, A. 
Alexandra, A. Quinn and A. Dunn (forthcoming 
2009) Media, Markets and Morals. Oxford: Black-
well Publishers.   
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media corruption that outlines and examines the 
different types of media corruption see (Spence in 
press 2008).  
Such media corrupt practices, which once appeared 
only in the old corporate media (newspapers, televi-
sion and radio), have increasingly become more 
prevalent on the Internet, for example, in blogs. 
Media deception is demonstrably unethical on the 
basis of the PGC because it can actually or potential-
ly at least violate the rights to freedom and wellbe-
ing that people have generally as agents and specif-
ically, as citizens that require accurate, reliable and 
trustworthy information on matters of public inter-
est. More generally, media deception through collu-
sion by PR professionals, journalists and govern-
ment representatives, violate all citizens‟ rights to 
freedom and wellbeing collectively by undermining 
the democratic process itself that requires the 
truthful, fair and objective production and dissemi-
nation of information on matters of public interest. 
It is partly for that reason that media control is 
sought and exercised by totalitarian regimes, such 
as those in China and Iran for example, that do not 
want their citizens to be well informed.  
In discussing the link between business intelligence 
and moral intelligence with regard to information I 
have specifically focused on the corporate media 
because it offers a uniquely paradigmatic case of the 
conceptual and practical convergence between 
“business intelligence” in the media‟s role as a type 
of a commercial market enterprise on the one hand, 
and “moral intelligence” in its formal role as a pro-
fessional body of disseminators of public information 
to citizens and consumers, on the other. However, 
insofar as information as a process and product of 
communication necessitates unavoidable epistemo-
logical and ethical commitment as demonstrated by 
the dual-obligation information theory (DOIT) model 
argued for in this paper, those same commitments 
apply to all informational agents both inside and 
outside the media. In particular, it should be em-
phasized that all informational agents in their func-
tional role within companies (and not just media 
companies) as well as in their functional role within 
the market economy generally (for example, for 
gaining and disseminating information about com-
petitors and products, amongst other things) are 
constrained by the same epistemological and ethical 
principles to which the media are committed. This 
consideration also reveals and renders apparent the 
important underlying link between media and busi-
ness intelligence, as most large corporate companies 
these days have their own internal media depart-
ments for disseminating information to the public so 
as to protect and promote their business inter-
ests114. The widely reported IT fraud in India recent-
ly concerning the outsourcing corporation Satyam 
that has been accused of inflating its profitability 
status by falsifying its accounts and financial state-
ments, illustrates how terribly things can go wrong 
both morally and commercially when information is 
abused and misused to misinform the public, the 
Stock Exchange, investors, share-holders and 
clients115. This goes to show that when it comes to 
information, truth is the best policy, both with 
regard to business intelligence as well as moral 
intelligence. 
Conclusion 
DOIT has provided a meta-conceptual framework 
comprising two inter-related parts that together 
demonstrate the epistemological and ethical univer-
sal character of information. Together these two 
inter-related parts have demonstrated the doubly-
normative structure of information; (a) by disclosing 
the inherently normative structure of information 
and revealing the epistemological and ethical princi-
ples and values inherent in information as a process 
of communication to which all informational agents 
are universally committed (Spence 2009 in press; 
and 2007a); and (b) by disclosing the universal 
rights (freedom and wellbeing) to which all informa-
tional agents are entitled by virtue of the inherent 
normative structure of action (Spence 2006; Gewirth 
1978; 1996; and Beyleveld 1991). Hence, together 
these two inter-related parts of DOIT have demon-
strated the doubly-normative structure of informa-
tion action, to which all informational agents, includ-
ing the media are committed by universal necessity. 
Thus, information as communication can generally 
be epistemologically and ethically evaluated inter-
nally by reference to its inherent normative struc-
ture. That structure commits its disseminators, to 
ethical and epistemological norms. This is especially 
                                               
114 I would like to acknowledge my thanks to the 
reviewers and editors of this paper for pointing 
out to me the more general application and relev-
ance of my argument to the business intelligence  
of companies generally. 
115 See, for instance, the article “Indian IT fraud 
sparks economic fears” by Salil Panchal, reported 
in the Sydney Morning Herald, January 8, 2009. 
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true of the media and its professional communica-
tors such as Journalists and PR Consultants, for 
example, on-line and off-line.  
In addition, the ethical values to which the inherent 
normative structure of information as communica-
tion gives rise requires that the informational 
agents‟ rights to freedom and wellbeing must be 
respected, secured and promoted. Those values are 
mandated by the Principle of Generic Consistency 
(PGC) and therefore information can also be exter-
nally evaluated by reference to the PGC. In sum, 
informational action as both information and action 
is doubly normative.  
In view if this, the media (including the new media) 
as the primary producer and disseminator of infor-
mation to the public through all the different modes 
and channels of media communication, including 
journalism, public relations and advertising, offline 
and online, has a particularly central and crucial 
moral role in the dissemination of information to the 
public. This places upon it the highest moral respon-
sibility in ensuring that the information it produces 
and disseminates accords with the highest episte-
mological and ethical standards as outlined in this 
paper, notwithstanding that the media, as media-
markets, operating within a free-market economy, is 
also unavoidably and perhaps desirably, a commer-
cial enterprise. However, as we would not settle for 
less stringent norms of professional conduct from 
other commercial industries such as those of the 
food and pharmaceutical production and distribution 
industries, we should not be expected to settle for 
less when it comes to the media. Information is a 
vital commodity whose integrity is paramount to the 
wellbeing of individuals and society. The media‟s 
role in safeguarding the integrity of information is 
therefore of the utmost importance in the age of 
information.  Hence, with regard to the dissemina-
tion of information by the media, its business intelli-
gence must always be guided and accord to moral 
intelligence that of universal necessity is mandated 
by the dual inherent normative structure of informa-
tion. Moreover, as discussed above, the same epis-
temological and ethical constraints apply to all 
informational agents, both within and outside the 
media, and in particular informational agents whose 
role within companies of all types and sizes is critical 
with regard to both the business intelligence as well 
as the moral intelligence of the information gathered 
and disseminated by them to the public, their com-
petitors and to all other relevant stake-holders.  
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